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When analyzing a strategic situation, we often assume the common knowledge of payoﬀs
and describe the situation as a complete information game. However, the predictions
derived from a complete information game may be very diﬀerent from those derived from
games with an information structure that departs ‘slightly’ from common knowledge, as
demonstrated by Rubinstein (1989) and Carlsson and van Damme (1993).
In this light, Kajii and Morris (1997a,b) introduced the concept of equilibria that are
robust to incomplete information. A Nash equilibrium of a complete information game
is said to be robust to incomplete information if every incomplete information game the
payoﬀs of which diﬀer from those of the original game only very rarely has a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium close to the Nash equilibrium.
The robustness of equilibria in Kajii and Morris (1997a) and that in Kajii and Morris
(1997b) are slightly diﬀerent. In the deﬁnition of robustness, Kajii and Morris (1997a)
considered incomplete information games such that, with high probability, each player
knows that her payoﬀs coincide with those of the complete information game, and with low
probability, payoﬀs may be quite diﬀerent. Kajii and Morris (1997b) restricted attention to
incomplete information games such that, with high probability, each player knows that her
payoﬀs also coincide with those of the complete information game, but with low probability,
she has some dominant action. Thus, if a Nash equilibrium is robust in the sense of Kajii
and Morris (1997a) then it is also robust in the sense of Kajii and Morris (1997b). Whether
or not the converse holds is an open question.
This paper provides a new suﬃcient condition for the robustness of an equilibrium
to incomplete information in sense of Kajii and Morris (1997b) in terms of nested best
response potential maximizers. The nested best response potential functions generalize the
best response potential functions introduced in Morris and Ui (2005), applying the idea
of ‘nesting’ based on Uno (2007). A best response potential function of a game is a real-
valued function on the set of action proﬁles of the game that ‘incorporates information’
about every players’ best response. It is known that every maximizer of a best response
potential function is a Nash equilibrium of the game. It is as if the best response potential
function is the payoﬀ function of a representative agent that chooses strategies for all
players.
In considering a nested best response potential function, we think of a representative
agent for a subset T of players, instead of one for all of them: for each player i in T, given
any belief over the set of strategy proﬁles of other players, maximizing this representative
agent’s payoﬀ fT yields a best response for each player i in T. Suppose that there is a
2partition T of players such that, for each member T of T , there is such a representative
agent whose payoﬀ function is fT.3 Then the collection of fT’s can be seen as a new
complete information game, where each member T in T is regarded as a single player.
That is, the original game is reduced to a game with a smaller number of players.
Notice that such reduction can be nested: the new game among step 1 representative
agents may be reduced to a game with an even smaller number of players, by considering a
step 2 representative agent for each member of a partition of step 1 representative agents,
and then a representative agent for each member of a partition of these, and so on. We
say that a game has a nested best response potential if a game is reduced to a game with
one representative agent through this process. We call a unique maximizer of nested best
response potential function a nested best response potential maximizer.
The main result of this paper shows that a nested best response maximizer is robust to
incomplete information in sence of Kajii and Morris (1997b) (Theorem 4.1).
In the literature, various suﬃcient conditions are given for robustness to incomplete
information in sence of Kajii and Morris (1997b). Kajii and Morris (1997a,b) provided
suﬃcient conditions in terms of unique correlated equilibria or p-dominance equilibria. Ui
(2001) provided a suﬃcient condition based on an exact potential maximizer introduced by
Monderer and Shapley (1996). Morris and Ui (2005) provided a suﬃcient condition in terms
of generalized potential maximizers, which uniﬁed and strictly generalized the conditions
of Kajii and Moris (1997a,b) and Ui (2001). Morris and Ui (2005) also introduced three
special but tractable classes of generalized potentials: best response potentials, monotone
potentials, and local potentials. Tercieux (2006) provided a suﬃcient condition for games
with p-best response sets, which strictly generalized the conditions of Kajii and Morris
(1997a,b) but specialized the condition in terms of local potential maximizers provided by
Morris and Ui (2005). Oyama and Tercieux (2009) provided a suﬃcient condition for games
with an iterated monotone potential maximizer, which generalized the condition in terms
of monotone potential maximizers provided by Morris and Ui (2005).4
Our condition in terms of nested best response potential maximizers strictly general-
izes the conditions in terms of exact potential maximizers in Ui (2000) and best response
potential maximizers in Morris and Ui (2005). We demonstrate this point in Example 5.2
below. Moreover, we also demonstrate that our condition neither implies nor is implied by
the conditions in terms of unique correlated equilibria or p-dominance equilibria provided
by Kajii and Morris (1997a,b) and the condition in terms of p-best response sets provided
3This idea also has appeared as q-potential in Monderer (2007).
4In these conditions, the conditions excluding that in terms of exact potential maximizers provided by
Ui (2000) and that in terms of best response potential maximizers provided by Morris and Ui (2005) also
are suﬃcient conditions for robustness to incomplete information in sense of Kajii and Morris (1997a).
3by Tercieux (2006). However, it is left as an open question whether our condition has some
inclusion relation with the conditions in terms of generalized potential maximizers, the
monotone potential maximizers, and local potential maximizers provided by Morris and Ui
(2005), and the condition in terms of the iterated monotone potential maximizers provided
by Oyama and Tercieux (2009).
The organization of this paper is as follows. Section 2 deﬁnes robust equilibria. Section 3
introduces the nested best response potentials. Section 4 provides the main result. Section
5 includes a discussion on the relations between the related literature and our result, and
some concluding remarks.
2 Robust equilibria
A ﬁnite complete information game consists of a ﬁnite player set N = {1,...,n}, a ﬁnite
action set Ai for i ∈ N, and the payoﬀ function gi : A → R for i ∈ N, where A :=
∏
i∈N Ai. Since we ﬁx the set A of action proﬁles, we denote a complete information
game (N,(Ai)i∈N,(gi)i∈N) simply by gN := (gi)i∈N. For notational convenience, we write
a = (ai)i∈N ∈ A; for i ∈ N, A−i =
∏
j̸=i Aj and a−i = (aj)j̸=i ∈ A−i; and for T ⊆ N,
AT =
∏
i∈T Ai, aT = (ai)i∈T ∈ AT, A−T =
∏
i∈N\T Ai, and a−T = (ai)i∈N\T ∈ A−T. We
write (aT,a−T) ∈ AT × A−T. We write (ai,a−i) instead of (a{i},a−{i}) for simplicity.
Consider an incomplete information game with the player set N and the set A of action
proﬁles. Let Θi be a countable set of types of player i. The set of type proﬁles is Θ :=
∏
i∈N Θi. We write Θ−i =
∏
j̸=i Θj and θ−i = (θj)j̸=i ∈ Θ−i; for T ⊆ N, ΘT =
∏
i∈T Θi,
θT = (ti)i∈T ∈ ΘT, Θ−T =
∏
i∈N\T Θi, and θ−T = (θi)i∈N\T ∈ Θ−T. Let P ∈ ∆(Θ) be the
common prior probability distribution over the set Θ of type proﬁles such that for each i ∈
N and θi ∈ Θi, the marginal probability of θi is positive, i.e., Pi(θi) :=
∑
θ−i∈Θ−i P(θi,θ−i) >
0.5 A payoﬀ function for player i is a bounded function ui : A × Θ → R. Since we will ﬁx
N, Θ, and A throughout the paper, we simply denote an incomplete information game by
(P,u), where u := (ui)i∈N.
A strategy of player i is a function σi : Θi → ∆(Ai). We write Σi for the set of
strategies of player i, and write Σ =
∏
i∈N Σi and σ = (σi)i∈N ∈ Σ; Σ−i =
∏
j̸=i Σj and
σ−i = (σj)j̸=i ∈ Σ−i; for T ⊆ N, ΣT =
∏
i∈T Σi and σT = (σi)i∈T ∈ ΣT. We write
σi(ai|θi) for the probability of action ai given σi ∈ Σi and θi ∈ Θi. For σ ∈ Σ, we write
σ(a|θ) =
∏
i∈N σi(ai|θi) for a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ; for σ−i ∈ Σ−i, σ−i(a−i|θ−i) =
∏
j̸=i σj(aj|θj)
for a−i ∈ A−i and θ−i ∈ Θ−i; for T ⊆ N and σT ∈ ΣT, σT(aT|θT) =
∏
i∈T σi(ai|θi) for
aT ∈ AT and θT ∈ ΘT.
5For a set S, ∆(S) denotes the set of all probability distributions over S.
4A strategy proﬁle (σi)i∈N ∈ Σ is a (Bayesian Nash) equilibrium of (P,u) if, for each













i ∈ Ai, where P(θ−i|θi) = P(θi,θ−i)/
∑
ˆ θ−i∈Θ−i P(θi, ˆ θ−i).
Given a complete information game gN and an incomplete information game (P,u), for
each i ∈ N, consider the subset ¯ Θi of Θi such that, if θi ∈ ¯ Θi is realized, i’s payoﬀs are
given by gi independently of the every types θ−i of the other players:
¯ Θi = {θi ∈ Θi|ui(a,(θi,θ−i)) = gi(a) for all a ∈ A,θ−i ∈ Θ−i with P(θi,θ−i) > 0}. (1)
We write ¯ Θ =
∏
i∈N ¯ Θi. An incomplete information game (P,u) is a δ-elaboration of
gN if P(¯ Θ) = 1 − δ, where δ ∈ [0,1].
Kajii and Morris (1997a) introduced the robustness of equilibria to all elaborations.
Deﬁnition 2.1 An action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) is robust to all elaborations in gN if, for
any ε > 0, there exists ¯ δ > 0 such that, for any 0 < δ ≤ ¯ δ, every δ-elaboration of gN has
an equilibrium σ with maxa∈A |µ(a) −
∑
θ∈Θ P(θ)σ(a|θ)| ≤ ε.
Kajii and Morris (1997b) also introduced the following weaker notion of robustness of
equilibria to ‘canonical’ elaborations.
A type θi ∈ Θi\¯ Θi is committed if player i of this type has a strictly dominant action
a
θi
i ∈ Ai, i.e., ui((a
θi
i ,a−i),(θi,θ−i)) > ui((ai,a−i),(θi,θ−i)) for all ai ∈ Ai\{a
θi
i }, a−i ∈ A−i,
and θ−i ∈ Θ−i with P(θi,θ−i) > 0. A δ-elaboration (P,u) of gN is canonical if, for each
i ∈ N, every θi ∈ Θi\¯ Θi is a committed type.
Deﬁnition 2.2 An action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) is robust to canonical elaborations in
gN if, for every ε > 0, there exists ¯ δ > 0 such that, for all 0 < δ ≤ ¯ δ, any canonical
δ-elaboration of gN has an equilibrium σ with maxa∈A |µ(a) −
∑
θ∈Θ P(θ)σ(a|θ)| ≤ ε.
It is clear that if an action distribution is robust to all elaborations, then it is also robust
to canonical elaborations.6
6Whether or not the converse holds is an open question.
53 Nested best response potentials
This section introduces the notion of nested best response potential for complete informa-
tion games. The nested best response potentials generalize the best response potentials
introduced in Morris and Ui (2005). A best response potential of a complete information
game gN is a real valued function f on the set A of action proﬁles such that, for each
player i and for any i’s belief λi ∈ ∆(A−i) over the set A−i of other players’ actions, i’s best
response against the belief λi in the alternative game where i’s payoﬀ function is given by
f, is also his best response in the original game gN:7
Deﬁnition 3.1 (Morris and Ui, 2005) A function f : A → R is a best response poten-










for all λi ∈ ∆(A−i).
We generalize the best response potentials by means of the ‘nested construction’ pro-
posed in Uno (2007) as follows: ﬁrstly, for a partition T of N, we deﬁne the best response
T -potentials:8
Deﬁnition 3.2 Let T be a partition of N. A best response T -potential of gN is a 3-tuple










for all λi ∈ ∆(A−i).
We denote such a best response T -potential (T ,(AT)T∈T ,(fT)T∈T ) by fT := (fT)T∈T
since action sets (AT)T∈T can be derived from the partition T of N and the set A of action
7There are three versions of best response potential in the literature. The best response potential of
Morris and Ui (2005) is a cardinal version of the pseudo-potentials introduced in Dubey et al. (2006). The
one of Morris and Ui (2004) is a version of best response potential where the inclusion of (2) is replaced by
the equality. The one of Voorneveld (2000) is an ordinal version of best response potential of Morris and
Ui (2004).
8The partition T best response potential generalizes Monderer (2007)’s q-potential: a strategic form
game gN has a q-potential if and only if gN has a partition T -potential, where q refers to the number of
elements in T and the potentials in (fT)T∈T are meant to be the exact potentials in Monderer and Shapley
(1996). If gN is a q-potential game, then it has a partition T best response potential such that the number
of elements of T is q. The converse is not true, since there is a best response potential game without an
exact potential.
6proﬁles in the original game gN. Notice that we can regard each best response T -potential
fT as a strategic form game, where T is the player set; for each T ∈ T , AT is the action set
of T; and for each T ∈ T , fT is the payoﬀ function of T. The idea underlying the notion
of the nested best response potentials is to construct such games iteratively:
Deﬁnition 3.3 A function f : A → R is a nested best response potential of gN if there
exist a ﬁnite sequence {T k}K




of 3-tuples such that
• {T k}K
k=0 is a nested sequence of partitions of N: {T k}K
k=0 is an increasingly coarser
sequence of partitions of N with T 0 = {{i}|i ∈ N} and T K = {N};
• fT 0 = (f0
T)T∈T 0 is the original game gN: for each i ∈ N, f0
{i}(a) = gi(a) for all a ∈ A;
• for each k = 1,2,...,K, fT k = (fk
T)T∈T k is a best response T k-potential of fT k−1 =
(f
k−1
T )T∈T k−1, where fT k−1 is regarded as a strategic form game as above: for each















for all λTk−1 ∈ ∆(A−Tk−1); and
• fT K = (fK
N ) is such that fK
N (a) = f(a) for all a ∈ A.
An action proﬁle a∗ is a nested best response potential maximizer (NBRP-maximizer) if
f(a∗) > f(a) for all a ∈ A with a ̸= a∗.
It is clear that if f is a best response potential of gN, then it is a nested best response
potential of gN. However, even if a complete information game has a nested best response
potential, it may not have a best response potential as shown in Example 3.4.
Example 3.4 Consider the three-person game g{1,2,3} = (g1,g2,g3) represented as Table
1, where player 1 chooses the row, player 2 chooses the column, and player 3 chooses the
matrix.
g{1,2,3} does not have a best response potential. Indeed, note that g{1,2,3} has a strict best
response cycle (U,C,T) → (U,R,T) → (U,R,B) → (U,C,B) → (U,C,T). Since games
with a pseudo-potential cannot have strict best response cycles as shown by Kukushkin
7T L C R
U 4,4,4 0,0,2 2,2,0
M 0,0,2 0,0,0 3,3,0
D 2,2,0 3,3,0 0,0,0
B L C R
U 3,3,3 2,2,0 1,1,2
M 2,2,0 3,3,3 0,0,1
D 1,1,2 0,0,1 0,0,1
Table 1: (g1,g2,g3)
UL UC UR ML MC MR DL DC DR
T 4,4 2,0 0,2 2,0 0,0 0,3 0,2 0,3 0,0




(2004), then games with a best response potential, which is a special case of pseudo-
potentials, cannot have either. Thus g{1,2,3} does not have a best response potential.
However, g{1,2,3} has a nested best response potential. Indeed, (f1
{3},f1
{1,2}) repre-
sented in Table 2 is a {{3},{1,2}}-best response potential of g{1,2,3}, where f1
{3}(·) = g3(·)
and f1
{1,2}(·) = g1(·) = g2(·), and considering the best response {{3},{1,2}}-potential
(f1
{3},f1
{1,2}) as a two-person complete information game, we can show that f{1,2,3} = (f)
represented in Table 3 is a {{1,2,3}}-best response potential of (f1
{3},f1
{1,2}). Thus g{1,2,3}
has a nested best response potential.
4 Nested potentials and robust equilibria
This section provides a suﬃcient condition for the robustness of equilibria in terms of the
nested best response potential maximizers.
Theorem 4.1 If gN has a nested best response potential f : A → R with a NBRP-
maximizer a∗, then the action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) such that µ(a∗) = 1 is robust to
canonical elaborations in gN.
UL UC UR ML MC MR DL DC DR
T 4 2 0 2 0 0 0 0 0
B 3 0 2 0 3 1 2 1 1
Table 3: f
8We can show this theorem by arguments similar to those of Theorem 6 in Morris and
Ui (2005). Indeed, we replace Lemma 6 of Morris and Ui (2005) by Lemma 4.3 below. Let
(P,u) be a canonical δ-elaboration of gN and consider the set of i’s strategies of (P,u) such
that each committed type θi ∈ Θi\¯ Θi chooses the strictly dominant action a
θi
i :9
Ξi := {ξi : Θi → Ai|ξi(θi) = a
θi
i for θi ∈ Θi\¯ Θi}.
Let Ξ :=
∏
i∈N Ξi = {ξ : Θ → A|ξ(θ) = (ξi(θi))i∈N for all θ ∈ Θ, and ξi ∈ Ξi for all i ∈
N}. For T ⊆ N, ΞT :=
∏
i∈N Ξi.
Note that if (P,u) is canonical then Ξ is nonempty (Morris and Ui, 2005, Lemma 4).
Let (P,u) be a canonical δ-elaboration of a complete information game gN with a nested





for all ξ ∈ Ξ and consider the set of its maximizers Ξ∗ := argmaxξ∈Ξ V (ξ).
The function V is constructed by a similar way to that of generalized potentials in Morris
and Ui (2005). We can show the following lemma by an argument similar to Lemma 5 in
Morris and Ui (2005).
Lemma 4.2 If Ξ is nonempty then Ξ∗ is nonempty. If ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ then
∑
θ∈Θ,ξ∗(θ)=a∗
P(θ) ≥ 1 − δκ,
where κ is a positive constant.10
We show that there exists an equilibrium of (P,u) assigning probability 1 to a maximizer
ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗ of V , which corresponds to Lemma 6 in Morris and Ui (2005).
Lemma 4.3 Suppose gN has a nested best response potential f and (P,u) is a canonical
δ-elaboration of gN. For ξ∗ ∈ Ξ∗, (P,u) has an equilibrium σ∗ ∈ Σ such that σ∗(·|θ) assigns
probability 1 to the action ξ∗(θ) for all θ ∈ Θ, i.e., σ∗(ξ∗(θ)|θ) = 1 for all θ ∈ Θ.
9Indeed, we set a domain A of generalized potential of Morris and Ui (2005) to
∏
i∈N{{ai}|ai ∈ Ai}.
10Or, κ > 0 is independent to δ. For example, κ = [f(a∗) − mina∈A f(a)]/[f(a∗) − maxa∈A\{a∗} f(a)].






−i(θ−i)),(θi,θ−i))] ≥ 0 (5)
for all ai ∈ Ai. Fix any i ∈ N and θi ∈ Θi. If θi ∈ Θi\¯ Θi, then (5) is true, since ξ∗
i (θi) is
the strictly dominant action a
θi
i of θi.
Suppose that θi ∈ ¯ Θi. Let a positive integer K and sequences (fT k)K
k=0 and (T k)K
k=0 be
such that, for each k = 0,1,...,K, {i} = T 0 ⊆ T 1 ⊆ ··· ⊆ T K−1 ⊆ T K = N, T k ∈ T k
and, f = fK
TK, so that f is a nested best response potential.
Firstly, since ξ∗ ∈ argmaxξ∈Ξ
∑


























for all aTK−1 ∈ ATK−1. Since fT K is a best response T K-potential of fT K−1, by (4), for each










−TK−1(θ−TK−1))] ≥ 0 (6)
for all aTK−1 ∈ ATK−1.










−TK−1(θ−TK−1))] ≥ 0 (7)
for all ξTK−1 ∈ ΞTK−1. Since T K−2 ⊆ T K−1, we have T K−1 = T K−2 ∪ T K−1\T K−2, and so
(ξTK−2,ξ∗















for all θ−TK−2 ∈ Θ−TK−2. By arguments similar to those given above, we have, for each











for all aTK−2 ∈ ATK−2.


















for all ai ∈ Ai. Since θi ∈ ¯ Θi, we have (5).
Lemma 4.2 and 4.3 imply that (P,u) has an equilibrium σ∗ ∈ Σ such that σ(ξ∗(θ)|θ) = 1














P(θ) ≥ 1 − δκ.
Thus, for each ε > 0, if we choose ¯ δ = ε/κ > 0, then, for each δ ≤ ¯ δ, every canonical
δ-elaboration (P,u) of gN has an equilibrium σ∗ such that 1 −
∑
θ∈Θ P(θ)σ∗(a∗|θ) ≤ ε,
which completes the proof.
5 Concluding remarks: related literature
This paper introduces the notion of nested best response potential for complete information
games and shows that a unique maximizer of a nested best response potential is a Nash
equilibrium of the game that is robust to incomplete information.
The remaining shows the relationships between our suﬃcient condition (Theorem 4.1)
and other suﬃcient condition in the literature. Morris and Ui (2005) provided a suﬃcient
11condition for games with a best response potential maximizer.11
Theorem 5.1 (Morris and Ui, 2005) If gN has a best response potential f : A → R
with a unique maximizer a∗, then the action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A) such that µ(a∗) = 1 is
robust to canonical elaborations in gN.
Our condition strictly generalizes Theorem 5.1. That is, if a game has a unique maxi-
mizer of a best response potential then the game also has a unique maximizer of a nested
best response potential since a best response potential is a nested best response potential.
However, a game with a unique maximizer of a nested best response potential may not
have a best response potential maximizer, which is shown by Example 5.2.
Example 5.2 (Example 3.4, continued) Consider the game g{1,2,3} in Table 1 again.
Theorem 5.1 does not apply to the game g{1,2,3} since it does not have a best response
potential, as demonstrated in Example 3.4. However, Theorem 4.1 applies to the game.
Indeed, g{1,2,3} has a nested best response potential f in Table 3. (U,L,T) is the unique
maximizer of the potential f. Thus, by Theorem 4.1, the action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A)
such that µ(U,L,T) = 1 is robust to canonical elaborations in g{1,2,3}.
Tercieux (2006) provided a suﬃcient condition that applies to games with the p-best
response set introduced by Tercieux (2004). For S−i ⊆ A−i, we denote Λpi(S−i) for the set










A set of action proﬁles S is a p-best response set if, when each player i believes with
probability greater than pi that the other players will play in Si, player i has a best response
in Si:
Deﬁnition 5.3 (Tercieux, 2004) Let p = (p1,...,pn) ∈ [0,1]N. A set
∏
i∈N Si, (Si ⊆
Ai,i ∈ N) is a p-best response set if, for each player i ∈ N, for all λi ∈ Λpi(S−i), there










i ̸∈ Si. A p-best response set S is a minimal p-best response set if no p-best response
set is a proper subset of S.
11Theorem 5.1 strictly generalized the suﬃcient condition in terms of exact potential maximizers by Ui
(2001), which was demonstrated by Morris and Ui (2004).
12For an action distribution µ ∈ ∆(A), we denote the support of µ by Supp(µ) := {a ∈
A|µ(a) > 0}.
If there exists a unique correlated equilibrium µ which support is a p-best response set
with
∑
i∈N pi < 1 then µ is robust to all elaborations in gN:12
Theorem 5.4 (Tercieux, 2006) Let S be a p-best response set with
∑
i∈N pi < 1 of game
gN. If there exists a unique correlated equilibrium µ such that Supp(µ) ⊆ S, then µ is robust
to all elaborations in gN.
Theorem 5.4 and our condition have no including relation. Indeed, Theorem 5.4 does
not apply to the game of Example 3.4.
Example 5.5 (Example 5.2, continued) Consider the game g{1,2,3} in Table 1 again.
As shown in Example 5.2, by Theorem 4.1, (U,L,T) is robust to canonical elaborations
in g{1,2,3}. However, Theorem 5.4 does not apply to the game. Note that S := {U,M} ×
{L,C} × {T,B} is a minimal (p1,p2,p3)-best response set
∑
i∈N pi < 1. Indeed, S is a
(p1,p2,p3)-best response set for p1,p2 ≥ 2/5 and p3 ≥ 0; {(U,L,T)} is a (p1,p2,p3)-best
response set for p1,p2 ≥ 3/5 and p3 ≥ 3/4; {(M,C,B)} which is a (p1,p2,p3)-best response
set for p1,p2 ≥ 1/2 and p3 ≥ 2/5; {U} × {L} × {T,B} is a (p1,p2,p3)-best response set
for p1,p2 ≥ 3/5 and p3 ≥ 0; {U,M} × {L,C} × {T} is a (p1,p2,p3)-best response set for
p1,p2 ≥ 2/5 and p3 = 1; and so on. And, we can show that there exist no unique correlated
equilibrium µ such that Supp(µ) ⊆ S, since g{1,2,3} has multiple equilibria (U,L,T) and
(M,C,B). Thus, Theorem 5.4 does not apply to the game.
On the other hand, Theorem 5.4 applies to the following game, as shown in Tercieux
(2006), but our result does not apply to the example.13
Example 5.6 (Tercieux, 2006) Consider the two-person game g{1,2,3} = (g1,g2) rep-
resented as Table 4, where player 1 chooses the row and player 2 chooses the column.
12Theorem 5.4 strictly generalized two suﬃcient conditions for the robustness to incomplete information
provided by Kajii and Morris (1997a), i.e., the one in terms of unique correlated equilibria and the one
in terms of p-dominant equilibria with
∑
i∈N pi < 1. Indeed, A =
∏
i∈N Ai is always a p-best response
set with
∑
i∈N pi < 1. Thus, if there exists a unique correlated equilibrium of gN, it is robust to all
elaborations in gN by Theorem 5.4. And, if a p-best response set with
∑
i∈N pi < 1 is a singleton {a} then
it is called p-dominant equilibrium with
∑
i∈N pi < 1. So, by Theorem 5.4, a is robust to all elaborations
in gN.
13There are other examples to which Theorem 4.1 does not apply but Kajii and Morris’ (1997a,b)
conditions do. For example, two-person matching penny games have a unique correlated equilibrium, so
the equilibrium is robust to all elaborations by a condition of Kajii and Morris (1997a,b). The game has
neither a best-response potential nor a nested best-response potential, since the game is two-person game
and has a best-response cycle. So, Theorem 4.1 does not apply to the game.
13L C R
U 5,5 1,4 1,0
M 4,1 3,4 5,3
D 0,1 4,3 4,4
Table 4: (g1,g2)
Theorem 5.4 applies to the game. The game g{1,2} has a minimal (p1,p2,p3)-best re-
sponse set {M,D} × {C,R} with p1,p2 = 1/3, and µ ∈ ∆(A) such that µ(a′) = 1/4 for
a′ ∈ {M,D}×{C,R} is a unique correlated equilibrium with support in {M,D}×{C,R},
as shown in Tercieux (2006). By Theorem 5.4, µ is robust to all elaborations in g{1,2}.
However, Theorem 4.1 does not apply to the game. Indeed, note that g{1,2} has a strict
best response cycle (M,C) → (D,C) → (D,R) → (M,R) → (M,C). Since games with
a pseudo-potentials cannot have strict best response cycles, games with a best response
potential, which is a special case of pseudo-potentials, cannot either. Thus, g{1,2} does
not have a best response potential. For two-person games, a best response potentials is
equivalent to a nested best response potential. Thus, Theorem 4.1 does not apply to the
game.
There are other suﬃcient conditions for the robustness to incomplete information. Mor-
ris and Ui (2005) provided a suﬃcient condition for games with generalized potential max-
imizer, which uniﬁed and generalized Kajii and Morris’ (1997a,b) conditions and the con-
dition in terms of exact potential maximizers by Ui (2001). Morris and Ui (2005) also
introduced special but tractable classes of generalized potentials: monotone potentials and
local potentials. Oyama and Tercieux (2009) provided a suﬃcient condition for games with
an iterated monotone potential maximizer, which generalized the condition in terms of
monotone potential maximizers.14 The conditions in terms of monotone potential maxi-
mizers, local potential maximizers, and iterated monotone potential maximizers apply only
to games with linearly ordered action sets. On the contrary, our condition in terms of nested
best response potential maximizers applies to games with unordered action sets. Once we
restrict attention to games with linearly ordered action sets, it remains to be checked what
is the relation between the above conditions and ours.It also remains to be checked what is
the relation between the condition in terms of generalized potential maximizers and ours.
14Whether or not the condition in terms of iterated monotone potential maximizers strictly generalizes
the one in terms of monotone potential maximizers is an open question.
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